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BOOK REVIEWS
HOW INSIGHTFUL CAN THIS BE?
Campbell, Kurt M., and Michèle Flournoy et al. To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against
Terrorism. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2001. 416pp. $18.95
As death and taxes are inevitable to citi-
zens of the United States, so also are the
contemporary strategic blueprints writ-
ten after a crisis has occurred. In Novem-
ber 2001 the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a Washington
think tank that focuses on national secu-
rity, published To Prevail, offering a
comprehensive strategy to guide the Bush
administration’s “global war on terror.”
From inception to press, the book took
less than two months to complete. How
insightful can such an “instant” piece of
strategic reasoning really be? The answer
is “surprisingly so.”
To Prevail is a decidedly mixed bag of
facts, analysis, insight, and recommenda-
tions. For example, the chapter on the
Taliban appears quaint in light of very re-
cent history (since November 2001).
Other chapters, especially those dealing
with military and economic issues, come
across as shallow and too general for real
utility. However, the overall conception
of the book and its on-the-mark chapters
dealing with intelligence, law enforce-
ment, diplomacy, and foreign assistance
make this an invaluable guide to the
post-“9/11” national security world.
Reflecting the mixed nature of the book
are findings and recommendations in the
closing chapter that call for applause but
lead to more questions. Meriting ap-
plause, the book’s recommendations re-
assert the need for engagement and an
active, focused diplomacy with the rest of
the world. Readers are reminded that the
United States must win this war with the
cooperation of a “coalition of coalitions”;
that the United States must win the in-
formation wars, not only in cyberspace
but in the international public forum of
debate (the press, television, and the In-
ternet); and that it must pay attention to
coordinating its aid efforts to focus such
assistance so as to reinforce the public
message that the country wishes and
needs to send.
Also, To Prevail summarizes the intelli-
gence needs for this conflict in ways that
are only now being discussed among ex-
ecutive and congressional decision mak-
ers. The authors point out the dangerous
parochialism within U.S. intelligence
agencies and the overwhelming need for
more and better human intelligence. This
is coupled with the authors’ argument for
expanded international engagement, for
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in the short term, other nations can
provide the human intelligence capabil-
ities that the United States currently
lacks. Finally, the authors recognize
that local and state officials rather than
members of the federal government are
on the front lines in one major theater
of operations—the homeland. Conse-
quently, the book recommends ways of
allowing decentralized coordination
among federal, state, and local authori-
ties that maintain a balance between the
civil rights of the citizenry and the ne-
cessity of prosecuting a vigorous
campaign.
However, one must ask why—in light
of their insightful recognition for the
need for an integrated command, con-
trol, and coordination of an incredibly
diverse repertoire of efforts to fight the
war against terrorism—the authors re-
fused to consider any real command
and control organization, process, sys-
tem, or doctrine. In place of such a use-
ful, even vital capability, To Prevail
merely calls for more commissions,
more coordination, and more openness,
and information sharing among exist-
ing agencies. The authors are Washing-
ton veterans who must know how naïve
their recommendations on this matter
sound. They recommend against form-
ing a powerful department of homeland
security that would be capable of inte-
grating the diverse and often contradic-
tory and self-defeating efforts of a
variety of federal agencies. One never
really fully understands who or what
the authors are suggesting will conduct
the overall campaign planning and
oversight of the global war on terror.
The fact is that at this writing, it is still
not clear which federal entity is conduct-
ing the command and control functions
of much of the global campaign. This
country learned quickly in World War
II that crises alone, even sneak attacks,
do not overcome bureaucratic turf
wars; the nation is relearning that les-
son now. The authors must know this,
and they should propose an organiza-
tional framework to implement the
wide array of global and domestic mea-
sures advocated in their strategy.
To Prevail is for the serious strategic
thinker and decision maker. It is a com-
mendable effort to bring together in
one place a comprehensive strategy that
can bring success in what promises to
be a long and unusual war. My only
quibble is the shortage of relevant cita-
tions, which is probably due to the
quickness of editing and publication.
Such is the price of currency.
JON CZARNECKI
Naval War College
Monterey Program
Baylis, John, et al., eds. Strategy in the Contempo-
rary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies.
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002. 356pp.
$27.95
Although not recognized as an equal ac-
ademic discipline by mainstream aca-
demics, the study of strategy has a long
and honorable history—the result of
numerous authors who, over the centu-
ries, have developed their ideas and
placed their own imprints on the disci-
pline. Since the beginning of the Cold
War, when the threat of nuclear de-
struction concentrated the minds of
scholars, the field shifted from tradi-
tional military concerns to the study of
nuclear deterrence. But now, more than
a decade beyond the end of the Cold
War, strategic studies return to their
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